The Clinic Belongs to the Local Government: Fixing Nigeria’s PHC

Nigeria keeps counting health centres. It should be counting who answers for them. In this piece, I argue that the number of primary health care (PHC) facilities in the country is enough, what needs strengthening is accountability of owners, staff, and ward level committees

In Bari-Bari, a community in Gurdi ward of Abaji Area Council, a short drive from the seat of power in Abuja, residents say reptiles have taken over their primary health centre. Health workers abandoned it more than six years ago, and the sick now cross into neighbouring states for treatment. Their plea for help went, tellingly, to the council authorities.

That instinct is right, and it is where our national argument about primary health care should begin. We have spent years debating how many PHCs Nigeria needs. The more useful question is who answers when one fails. My answer is the local government council, made accountable in law and in public for keeping each clinic open. Nigeria’s own history, the Constitution and the 2024 Supreme Court ruling on council autonomy all point the same way.

A promise we keep remaking

The federal government’s current plan is serious. In 2024 the Coordinating Minister of Health, Muhammad Ali Pate, announced a plan to revive 8,300 PHCs and expand and upgrade 17,000 within three years, funded through World Bank IDA financing and the Basic Health Care Provision Fund (BHCPF). The National Primary Health Care Development Agency (NPHCDA) now says it has revitalised 4,434 centres and that 53 per cent of PHCs are functional. Quarterly patient visits have risen from 33 million to between 43 and 45 million.

To give Credit where it is due, people come back when the clinic works. But we have been here before. In 2016–17 the government pledged to revitalise 10,000 PHCs. This month, the civic-tech group MonITNG showed a federal health centre in Logundu, Ile-Oluji, Ondo State, still abandoned after nearly 20 years of public funding. By its count, ₦249.6 billion left the BHCPF in three years while thousands of centres remain poorly equipped, understaffed or non-functional.

Buildings are renovated from Abuja. They decay locally. A refurbished clinic with nobody answerable for its roof, its generator, the community health officer, and its nurse is a ribbon waiting to fade.

The job was always for the Local council’s

The Fourth Schedule of the 1999 Constitution gives local government a role, alongside the state, in providing and maintaining primary health care. As Ben Nkechika of the Association of Local Governments of Nigeria (ALGON) put it at a national dialogue in June, “The responsibility has always been there.” What councils lacked was money, and any real chance of being judged on it.

This is not a new idea. Between 1986 and 1990, health minister Olikoye Ransome-Kuti expanded PHC to every local government, devolved responsibility for it to LGAs and pushed child immunisation above 80 per cent. Nigeria’s primary health care of that era earned the country a top global ranking. Part of what worked was simple: a defined local authority owned a defined local service.

Since then, responsibility has blurred. The 2011 Primary Health Care Under One Roof policy consolidated leadership and resources under state PHC agencies, a sensible fix for fragmentation that also let councils off the hook. The NPHCDA’s own chief executive now says the agency is responsible for defining primary health care, not delivering it. States run boards, Abuja funds renovations, donors fund projects, and when the clinic in Bari-Bari closes, nobody’s name is on the door.

Autonomy must come with an invoice

The July 2024 Supreme Court judgment ordered that the 774 councils receive their allocations directly. It has been honoured largely in the breach: Nigeria Health Watch reports that states held on to more than ₦7.43 trillion meant for councils between July 2024 and December 2025. That fight matters. But winning it is not enough. If councils get their money with no clear duty attached, autonomy simply moves the leakage one tier down.

The strongest objection to my case is exactly that councils are among the weakest and least transparent institutions in the country. Only 40 per cent of LGAs even have a medical officer of health. Why hand clinics to them?

Because accountability does not need a perfect institution. It needs a nameable one, and the local government is the tier closest to the people who use the clinic. A governor can hide behind a statewide programme. A council chairman cannot easily hide from a ward whose only clinic is locked. The answer to weak local government is to make their PHC record impossible to ignore:

  • One clinic, one named official. Every PHC should have a council officer publicly responsible for whether it opens, is staffed and is stocked.
  • Publish the scorecard. Each council should post, every quarter, the status of each clinic and the money it received, including the ₦600,000 to ₦800,000 in direct facility financing, on its noticeboards and online.
  • Tie money to function. Part of each council’s health spending, and any federal top-ups, should depend on clinics verified as functional by the NPHCDA’s own standards.
  • Give communities a signature. Ward Development Committees should co-sign facility reports before funds are released.
  • Keep the state as referee. State PHC boards should set standards, train and supervise staff, and blow the whistle, not run every clinic from the state capital.

Who do we call?

Ransome-Kuti gave his 1986 inaugural lecture the title That Our Children Will Not Die. The ambition still stands, but our method has drifted from local ownership to central campaigns. The next time a woman in labour finds her clinic locked, as Aisha Sani did in Benue this year, there should be a council official whose job, budget and re-election depend on that door being open.

Counting clinics has become Abuja’s habit. Running them must become the council’s duty. Until we settle who answers for a PHC, every new one we build will inherit the fate of the old.

Sources

Federal PHC revitalisation and progress

Failures and funding

Councils, the Constitution and autonomy

History

Four Registers, One Classroom: Why I Second-Guess Nigeria’s Official Numbers

Five years of chasing figures through Nigeria’s schools and clinics have taught me one rule: before you believe a number, find out who made it and what they will gain from it.

The head teacher reached for the admission register, a fat exercise book bound with masking tape, and ran her finger down the columns. Six hundred and twelve pupils, she said. That was the school’s own count.

At the Local Government Education Authority, the same school appeared with 780 pupils. At the State Universal Basic Education Board, it had 845. By the time the local government’s enrolment reached the planning figures that feed the national picture, it had grown by about a fifth in a year when the school’s own register was flat. On the morning I visited, I counted 431 children on the benches.

A few weeks later, at a primary health centre, it happened again. The outpatient register for one month showed about 290 attendances, each a name, an age and a complaint. The local government’s primary health care department reported more than 400 for that facility. The state’s figure was higher still. By the time the month reached the dashboards, it had gained nearly two hundred patients nobody could name.

The school and the clinic are composites, drawn from many I visited as an evaluator between 2013 and 2018. The figures are illustrative. The pattern is not. I have watched it repeat across states, sectors and years: one school or one clinic, and a different number at every level of government that touches it.

That is why, in 2018, I second-guess almost every headline administrative figure Nigeria produces, including enrolment, outpatient attendance, immunisation coverage, birth and death rates, and the census on which all of them rest. My reason is not that Nigerians cannot count. It is that at almost every level of our government, someone is rewarded for counting a particular way. The history of our censuses, the incentives written into how we share money, and the evidence of what happens when someone finally checks all point the same way.

Counting has always been political

In Nigeria, a headcount has never been just a headcount. Since before independence, population has decided seats in parliament and shares of national revenue. Every region therefore had a reason to want to be larger. Demographers trace the politicisation of census figures by ethnic interests back to the first post-independence counts. The 1962 exercise was abandoned amid disputes, and the 1973 results were cancelled outright.

The 2006 census was meant to break that pattern. It didn’t. The provisional results named Kano the most populous state, with 9.4 million, followed by Lagos with 9.0 million. Lagos had run a parallel count, and Governor Bola Tinubu said it found more than 17.5 million people, almost double. President Obasanjo dismissed the critics as “confusionists”.

Seven years later, in 2013, the National Census Tribunal nullified the 2006 results in 14 local government areas of Lagos and ordered a recount. In 2014 Festus Odimegwu, who had chaired the National Population Commission, went further. He said no census in Nigeria’s history had been valid.

It would be easy to turn this into a Lagos-versus-Kano quarrel, but that misses the point. Independent analysts reviewing the evidence have doubted both figures. The real lesson is that when a number decides money and power, every party to it has a motive and none of them has the standing to settle it. When the man who led the counting body says the count cannot be trusted, the rest of us are entitled to our doubts.

Those doubts have only grown with time. A new census was due in 2016, ten years after the last. In December 2015 the Commission said a 2016 census was not feasible. As I write in 2018, every official population figure in Nigeria, from the national total down to a ward’s catchment population, is a projection from a disputed 2006 count. Every enrolment rate, immunisation coverage rate, birth rate and death rate divides by one of those projections. If the denominator is a guess, so is the rate.

Every number has a constituency

The census is only the most visible case. The same logic runs through the everyday administrative data that schools, clinics and local governments produce, because Nigeria has written headcounts into how it shares money.

Start with the Federation Account. Under the horizontal formula, states share their portion on equality (40 per cent), population (30 per cent), internal revenue effort, landmass and terrain, and small weights for education, health and water. Local governments share theirs on a similar basis. Within their social development factor, primary school enrolment and hospital beds are counted. So a local government earns more if it reports more people, more pupils and more beds. I do not say any official sets out to cheat. I say the formula pays for the number, not for the truth of the number.

Now follow a single figure up the chain, as I have done many times.

  • The school or clinic. A head teacher knows that teacher postings, furniture, textbooks and attention follow enrolment. An officer in charge knows that drugs, commodities and staff follow attendance and catchment population. A modest rounding-up feels like protecting the children or the patients.
  • The local government. The LGEA or the PHC department collates dozens of returns, chases the ones that are late, and fills gaps with last term’s figure or an estimate. It also answers to the formula above.
  • The state. SUBEB and the state primary health care agency must reconcile local figures with last year’s totals, with targets in donor agreements, and with the counterpart funds they have committed. A sudden fall looks like failure, so the trend is smoothed.
  • The federal level. UBEC and NPHCDA receive aggregates, not registers. By the time a figure reaches Abuja, every adjustment beneath it has disappeared. The number arrives clean, and nobody can see where it came from.

This is what I mean by saying that aggregation launders a number. Each tier can be honest by its own lights, and the total can still be fiction.

None of this is peculiar to Nigeria, and the idea is not mine. The economist Charles Goodhart and the social scientist Donald Campbell both observed, in the 1970s, that a measure used to allocate rewards tends to stop measuring what it was meant to. James C. Scott, in Seeing Like a State (1998), described how governments need simple, legible numbers, and how people on the ground learn to supply them. And Morten Jerven’s Poor Numbers (2013) showed how fragile Africa’s development statistics are, with Nigeria as a central case. What is particular to Nigeria is how tightly money and power are tied to self-reported counts, and how many layers of government a figure passes through before anyone uses it.

When someone finally checks

Suspicion is cheap. What turns it into evidence is the moment someone checks a number against something that cannot be massaged: a satellite, a GPS trace, a fingerprint, a door-to-door count. In the last few years, Nigeria has had several such moments. Each one confirms the pattern.

Polio. For years, vaccination campaigns in the North were planned with inaccurate and incomplete hand-drawn maps, resulting in the exclusion of entire settlements. When outreach teams enumerated more than 46,000 scattered, nomadic and border settlements, 52 per cent of them were not in the microplan used for the previous campaign, and about one in five had been missed. In Kano, the state’s emergency operations centre found in August 2013 that target population estimates had been inflated. After a household-by-household recount, the number of identified settlements rose by 38 per cent, while enumerated households fell by 30 per cent. Monitoring reports put the cut in Kano’s under-five target population across all 44 LGAs at 53.4 per cent.

Read that again: more places, but fewer people. The old figures had overcounted children where vaccinators already went and left out the communities they never reached. This was the same distortion I saw in my classrooms, at the scale of a state. And it nearly cost the world polio eradication.

The payroll. In February 2016, after cross-checking civil servants’ records against their Bank Verification Numbers, the federal government removed 23,846 workers from its payroll who did not exist, a saving of about N2.29 billion a month. Every one of those ghosts had appeared in an official headcount of public employees. Nobody caught them until the payroll was checked against a biometric record that could not be invented.

Births and deaths. A birth rate or a death rate sounds like a fact. In Nigeria it is mostly an estimate. Only about 30 per cent of children under five have had their births registered, according to the 2013 Demographic and Health Survey. Even that figure is unsettled: another UNICEF profile reports registration rising from 23 per cent in 2007 to 60 per cent in 2013. From what I have seen in the field, death registration is thinner still. When most births and deaths never enter a register, the official rates come from surveys and models. They are useful, but they are not counts.

The economy. In April 2014, the National Bureau of Statistics rebased GDP, updating the base year from 1990 to 2010. The estimated size of the economy jumped from N42.4 trillion to N80.2 trillion, an 89 per cent increase. Overnight, Nigeria became Africa’s largest economy. The rebasing was a genuine improvement. But Jerven cautioned that the new figure still rests on a great many guesses. If the size of a whole economy can be understated by nearly half, the per-head figures built on it, and on a 2006 population count, deserve the same humility.

The best case against my doubt

There are serious people who would push back on this piece, and they deserve a hearing in their strongest form.

The first objection is that things are getting better, and that my examples prove it. The rebasing was the Bureau correcting itself. The polio programme built tracking systems and fixed its microplans. The finance ministry found its ghosts. The Statistician-General, Yemi Kale, has argued with Jerven himself that Africa may be seeing a statistical reawakening rather than a tragedy. On this view, a blanket scepticism punishes the reformers along with the fabricators.

The second objection is political. Doubt is not neutral. A government that dislikes its unemployment or poverty figures would like nothing better than a public that believes no number at all. A citizen who trusts nothing is easier to rule than one who trusts some things for good reasons.

The third is technical. Nigeria does not rely on administrative data alone. Household surveys such as the Demographic and Health Survey and the Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey exist precisely to check the registers. If you want the truth about enrolment or immunisation, the critic says, read the survey and stop worrying about the LGEA.

I accept much of this. The reformers are real, and I have worked alongside some of them. Cynicism is corrosive. Surveys are the best tool we have. But look at where every correction I have described came from. None of them came from the administrative chain checking itself. The ghost workers fell to bank biometrics. The phantom children fell to GPS trackers and door-to-door enumerators. The undercounted economy fell to a new base year. In each case, an independent instrument was needed to expose the official figure. That is my point, not a rebuttal of it.

Surveys, too, stand on the census. They draw their samples from enumeration areas mapped for the last count and weight their results to its projections. If the 2006 frame is wrong, the error travels quietly into the survey that is supposed to check it.So the doubt I am defending is not cynicism. A cynic says no number can be trusted and stops there. A sceptic asks what a number would have to survive before it deserves trust, and keeps asking. I trust a figure that has been checked against something its producer could not adjust. I second-guess a headline that has only travelled up the chain of the people paid by it.

How to read a Nigerian number

If doubt is a method, it needs rules. These are the ones I use, and I offer them to journalists, development partners, legislators and anyone who has to act on a figure from Abuja.

  1. Ask which tier produced it. A school register, an LGEA return and a national aggregate are three different claims. Find out which one you are looking at.
  2. Ask who gains if it rises or falls. If more pupils, patients or people bring more money, posts or seats, expect the figure to lean upward. If a fall would look like failure, expect it to be smoothed.
  3. Look for an independent check. A household survey, a GPS trace, a biometric audit or a headcount by someone with nothing at stake. A figure that has never met one is a claim, not a finding.
  4. Distrust smoothness. Real data are lumpy. Perfectly steady growth, rounded totals, or coverage above 100 per cent usually mean someone reconciled the number rather than measured it.
  5. Check the denominator. Every rate rests on a population figure, and every population figure in Nigeria today is projected from 2006. Ask how a rate would change if that base were wrong by a tenth.

Rules for readers are not enough, though. The system itself must stop paying for convenient numbers. Two reforms would go a long way.

First, publish the discrepancies instead of reconciling them away. If a school reports 612 pupils and the state reports 845, both figures should be public, side by side, with the gap explained. Sunlight on the gap would do more than another round of data-quality workshops.

Second, pay for verified numbers, not volume. Where money must follow headcounts, it should follow figures that have survived independent spot-checks: random headcounts in schools, register audits in clinics, verification by agents who are not paid by the people they verify. The polio programme and the payroll audit have already shown that this can be done in Nigeria. What is missing is the decision to apply it to the numbers that share our money.

Back to the classroom

I think often about the gap between 431 children on the benches and 845 on the state’s books. The missing four hundred did not need desks, textbooks or teachers, so the state planned for children who were not there. And if the same inflation runs everywhere, it also hides the children who are there but never counted: the nomadic settlement off the map, the infant whose birth was never registered, the patient seen at a clinic that never filed a return.

In this piece, I argued that Nigeria’s headline administrative numbers deserve doubt. That is not because counting is beyond us. It is because our history, our revenue formula and our layers of government reward particular numbers, and because aggregation erases the evidence of how they were made. Where independent checks have been applied, from polio maps to the payroll to the national accounts, the official figures have moved, sometimes by half.

The implication is uncomfortable but simple. A country that cannot count its children cannot plan their classrooms, vaccines or teachers. And a public that swallows every headline figure is not well informed. It has been misinformed with confidence.

This year Falz released “This Is Nigeria” (2018), a catalogue of the everyday absurdities Nigerians have learned to live with. Our numbers belong on that list. Until our figures are made, or at least checked, by people who gain nothing from making them larger, I will keep asking the same two questions of every headline – who counted, and what did they get for it?

Sources

Census history and the 2006 dispute

Revenue allocation

Polio microplanning and tracking

Payroll

Birth registration

GDP rebasing and data quality

Books and ideas cited without links

  • Morten Jerven, Poor Numbers: How We Are Misled by African Development Statistics and What to Do about It (2013)
  • James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State (1998)
  • Charles Goodhart (Goodhart’s law, 1975) and Donald T. Campbell (Campbell’s law, 1976)